After finishing my Ph.D. a couple of months ago, I have launched into a new research project in epistemology, which I (tentatively) call Unraveling Rationality.
The project draws a contrast between two kinds of rationality, two threads, that need to be unraveled to understand what rationality is about. One thread of rationality is personal, whereas the other is shared. I argue that the former kind of rationality is aptly described by Rorty and others, who argue that rationality is a measure of social accountability instead of representational reliability or truth. Yet, the latter kind of rationality is marked by collaboration, and hence by a shared aim. I suggest that this aim calls for a kind of rationality that is world-directed, which warrants the reintroduction of some of the philosophical verbiage — e.g., objectivity, truth, and representation — philosophers like Rorty are so keen to dispose of.
The focus of my PhD research was on truth and metaphilosophy. My thesis explored the practical roles of truth and showed that philosophical inquiry does not, and should not, aim for truth. I am currently working on further developing my metaphilosophical theories in light of my new work on rationality. I aspire to show that philosophy is a rational enterprise in spite of the fact that it does not pursue truth.
I have developed a pragmatist version of alethic pluralism (pluralism about truth). A version of this view can be found in my article “Alethic Pluralism for Pragmatists.” While this paper adopts a fairly traditional approach to pluralism about truth, my newest paper “Truth and Its Uses” offers a more radical version of pragmatist alethic pluralism by arguing that truth is a dual-purpose tool.
If you’re looking for a detailed summary of my philosophical work up to now, please check out the first four episodes of my podcast, Doing Philosophy.
Tom Kaspers 